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What a mistake
that Front was
According to the Chairman of the Italian neo-Communist Party who was on the other side of the barricade at the time of those elections, one of the reasons for his group's defeat was the notion proper of the People's Front. And he reveals that the plan to divide the world into two blocs was not originally Moscow's |
by ARMANDO COSSUTTA |
Armando Cossutta electioneering in 1948 |
The
year 1948 was charged with events with several relevant consequences for the political
affairs throughout an entire period of our history. The international developments are
common knowledge which, in truth, were spawned the year before, in 1947, the hinge or,
rather, the year of the breach with the previous phase characterized by the agreement of
the major anti-Fascist powers in the war against Hitler and Mussolini. This agreement,
already precarious during much of the World War itself and especially after the death of
Roosevelt who had been able and acutely long-sighted at Yalta - and before and after Yalta
- at mending the rift between Churchill and Stalin, was definitively broken by the British
leader's Fulton speech. That was when, using an effective, albeit very painful metaphor,
he spoke of an "iron curtain" which from that moment had fallen over Europe,
from Stettino to Trieste.
And
yet, the leading lights of the Italian left do not believe (or do not want to give in to)
that separation. This, in any event, is true of the Italian Communist Party. For in 1947
immediately after De Gasperi's visit to Washington, Communists and Socialists were cast
out of the government of which they had been a part since 1944 (though not continuously in
the Socialists' case). But there was no reaction to this routing which could even be
described as brutal, without any real motive.
I was
young at the time, the 20-year-old Communist Party secretary of Sesto San Giovanni (we had
18,000 paid-up members and a landslide election victory); I was able to hear the opinions
on those events at first hand: there was no ... I won't say a strike ... demonstration
either large or small against that routing that was to generate total discrimination
against Communism for a long time to come. Why? How come there was no serious opposition
mounted even though the left wing had a strong and incisive capacity for action in the
political, cultural and working life of the country?
I have
asked myself these questions over and over again. I feel like saying that it was because
Togliatti didn't want it. Of course not, because his intention was to prevent a risky
split with the Christian Democrats at the culmination of the joint work of the Constituent
Assembly scheduled to issue the historical text of the Constitution on January 1, 1948.
The very text was to be signed by three men who were themselves the expression of the
democratic agreement uniting the principal components of the ideals and politics of an
entire epoch: the liberal De Nicola, the Catholic De Gasperi, the Communist Terracini. But
perhaps another reason why he hadn't wanted a demonstration was because he believed that
the division would have come to rights again and that, in the short term, the three
"parties of the masses" (as the Christian Democrats, the Communists and the
Socialists were then called) would have come together again to govern. And maybe, on the
world scale, this was also the opinion of Stalin for he was proving reluctant to accept
the new situation as definitive in the belief that a resumption of collaboration engaging
the winners of the War was still possible. But, instead, the new war set in, the so-called
Cold War. It was a grave error, in my view, born of an underestimation, just as it was a
mistake - referring to Italy again - to have underestimated the incisiveness of the schism
in the Socialists' own ranks. This had been forged by Saragat to create a social
democratic group in net opposition to the Communists.
We
arrived at the April 18, 1948 general election unprepared on the left wing for the
confrontation ahead, convinced of a victory that was not on the cards of reality. Even the
creation of the People's Front had been a mistake because it made it difficult for the
Socialists to undertake any distinct action of their own (though still keeping the link
with us, not moving into the opposition). Yet, there would have been need (of such
distinct action) to counter the split in their own ranks caused by Saragat and to pursue
the votes of some Catholic elements who had been blinded by the anti-Communist drive but
not totally disposed to adhering to an anti-workers' policy.
The
election campaign was, in effect, a masterpiece of anti-Communist propaganda: I remember
the Christian Democrats' posters, terrifyingly illustrative of an eventual Communist
victory (Communists would not only lead to dictatorship by suppressing democratic liberty
but they would also take people's homes away from them, their cows and their land and they
would have ordered collective ownership even of women). On the other hand, these posters
were persuasive in depicting the beds of roses in the event of a Christian Democrat win. I
remember, too, the massive intervention on the part of the Church, of every parish and
every convent and monastery nationwide, and of the supreme ecclesiastical authorities who
even went so far as to proclaim, in one voice with Pope Pius XII, excommunication for
Communists and friends of Communists. I kept one manifesto that literally says this:
"EXCOMMUNICATION FOR COMMUNISTS. 1. It is prohibited to join Communist Parties or to
support them. 2. It is prohibited to publish, disseminate or read books, periodicals,
newspapers or pamphlets which sustain Communist doctrine and procedure, or to contribute
written matter to them. 3. All faithful who consciously and freely carry out any of the
above acts are prohibited from partaking of the Sacraments. 4. Faithful who profess the
materialist and anti-Christian Communist doctrine and, first among them, who defend it and
propagandize it, will be excommunicated as apostates".
Then
there was journalist Giovanni Guareschi's famous and sadly most effective slogan bandied
obsessively the length and breadth of Italy: "God can see you in the privacy of the
polling booth, Stalin can't". Less visible but no less authoritative and strongly
influential was the foreign intervention: I recall America's promises of economic and food
aid and, at the same time, their heavily threatening behavior with their warships
scurrying across our territorial waters. This foreign intervention was unacceptable - it
was at that time that, not a Communist but a liberal of old, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando,
shouted out his fiery invective at the government in the Chamber of the Lower House,
accusing it of "lusting to be servile".
Developments
on the international scene were exploited to accentuate the need for this foreign presence
in the face of an alleged invasion by the Soviet Union, which had already occupied central
European countries, provoked a crisis in Czechoslovakia overturning the democratic
government there and formed the Cominform. But now, we can happily say that the threat of
any Soviet intervention in Italy was always totally unfounded. The USSR neither wanted nor
would have been able to intervene in our country, just as in Greece, despite the uprising
and subsequent civil war led by the Communist Marcos, it did not intervene because Greece
was an Anglo-American protectorate. Italy was under the protection of the world's only
atomic power at the time - the United States. Another sign that the Soviet Union had no
designs of intervention for Italy was a famous meeting in Moscow between Pietro Secchia,
then Italian Communist Party Deputy Secretary, and Stalin himself who received Secchia in
the company of Molotov and Beria. Secchia relates that, when he asked about the
possibility of Soviet intervention or aid should Italy reach a pre-revolutionary stage,
Stalin replied by moving his index finger back and forth three times, and saying three
decisive "Niets". I also personally heard one Christian Democrat, the Rt. Hon.
Taviani, tell the Senate (though many years later!) that it had been a mistake to
concentrate all of Italy's defences in the North East in view of the threat of a Soviet
invasion, threat that was unsubstantiated and even non-existent. Taviani at the time was
speaking in his capacity as Minister of Defence.
There
was great fear in very many sectors of an eventual victory by the People's Front, that is,
by the Social-Communists (the single term used at the time for Socialists and Communists).
But there were also masses of ordinary people who were strong in their great hope of just
such a victory. And there was tremendous disappointment after the April 18 defeat. The
consequence was lacerating, much-felt frustration and an equally strong desire for
vindication. This goes some way to explain the impetuous uprising that was to take place a
few months later, on July 14, sparked by the assassination attempt on the life of Palmiro
Togliatti: it was a movement of vast proportions, a strike that paralyzed the countries
and that filled the towns and cities with marches and imposing demonstrations. I remember
how the legendary Milanese Communist leader, Giuseppe Alberganti, summarily described the
significance of the two dates. He was speaking to a great crowd of workers gathered in
Cathedral Square and he said: "We stood up to be counted on April 18 and on July 14
we have weighed in". A few years later, at the June 7 1953 elections, the left wing
beat Christian Democracy over a fraud law and Alcide De Gasperi was forced to resign.